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On April 5, 1995, German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl proclaimed , "Since German 
reunification, we have .. . created modern indus-
tries with internationally competitive jobs in 
the Eastern part of Germany .... Through finance 
and technology transfer, we have markedly 
increased the productivity of the Eastern 
German economy." ("C02 Levels," p. 29) As the 
leader of a unified Germany, Kohl boldly made 
this statement, attempting to show that during 
the five years after the Berlin Wall collapsed, 
technology transfer has successfully increased 
productivity in Eastern Germany. However, 
Eastern Germans have yet to experience the 
standard of living that their counterparts in the 
West enjoy. Although Chancellor Kohl is proud 
of the progress Germany has made in rebuild-
ing a once divided country, there is still an 
extraordinary economic gap between the two 
sectors. With an increase in the diffusion of 
technology from West to East, productivity and 
employment should rise, thereby raising the 
standard of living in the East. Since the focal 
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point of this chain of events is the successful 
transfer of technology to the East, it is critical 
for the country to provide the conditions that 
encourage such transfer to take place. 
In this paper, I will explain the process and 
the conditions necessary for technology trans-
fer. I will use Japan's technology policies after 
World War II as a model of successful technol-
ogy transfer by which to measure Germany's 
current progress. After detailing the effects that 
the lack of technology transfer has had on the 
Eastern German economy, I will analyze the 
obstacles that are hindering this transfer. The 
most significant of these barriers deal with the 
mindset of the German people, the education 
and training system in the Eastern sector, and 
the financial and political battles between large 
and small companies. In addition, I will address 
the positive and negative effects of the work of 
the Treuhand, or privatization agency. Finally, 
I will recommend improvements for overcom-
ing technology transfer problems in Germany 
and hastening the economic recovery in its 
Eastern sector. 
Defining Technology Transfer 
Before examining Eastern Germany's dif-
ficulties associated with technology transfer, it 
is first necessary to understand the key ele-
ments of technology and how it is transferred. 
Technology can be simply defined as "the 
knowledge and means to do something." The 
movement of this technology from one entity 
to another, as well as the understanding of how 
to apply it effectively, is technology transfer. 
This transfer is more than the mere movement 
of goods and equipment from one site to anoth-
er, because the physical object that is being pro-
duced is the product of technology and not the 
technology itself. Technology transfer consists 
of a sequence of steps. Specifically, the tech-
nology is developed by the source in one envi-
ronment and is then sent to the receiver in a 
different environment by means of a linking 
mechanism. Successful technology transfer 
implies that the technology is accepted and 
used by the receiver. (Schlie, pp. 75-77) 
If the transfer is successful, the impact it 
has on firms can be extremely positive. In fact, 
the ability to gain access to and utilize tech-
nology and knowledge is essential for improv-
ing the performance of enterprises. The extent 
to which technology and knowledge are gener-
ated and diffused in an economy typically con-
trols a country's degree of innovation and eco-
nomic performance and consequently its 
comparative advantage. Furthermore, innova-
tive companies and industries that use advanced 
technologies have succeeded in attaining above 
average productivity and employment growth. 
This, however, requires significant investment 
in intangibles on the part of these companies, 
such as undertaking research and development, 
obtaining external sources of technology, and 
improving managerial skills. (Cervantes) 
Although technology transfer has been 
associated with boosting productivity, its suc-
cess faces many challenges. Barriers of all 
types, including social, political, economic, and 
cultural, often stand in the way. In addition, 
the transfer is appropriate only if the new tech-
nology gives the receiver an advantage over its 
competition, the technology is compatible and 
not too complex for the receiver's capabilities, 
and the timing is appropriate. (Johnson) 
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Absorptive capacity is defined as the abil-
ity of the receiver to understand and use the 
technology that is being transferred. (Schlie, 
p. 80) Firms that have a high absorptive capac-
ity are made up of workers who are willing to 
accept organizational change and exist in an 
environment that is fit for the new technology. 
(Cervantes) Moreover, it is easier for the receiv-
er environment to adapt to the new technolo-
gy when it is similar to the source environment. 
Ideally, the easiest way to transfer technology 
is to recruit technologically qualified personnel 
from the source to join the receiver and bring 
their technology with them. (Schlie, pp. 77,79) 
Applying the principles of technology 
transfer to the situation in Germany, the obvi-
ous technology sources are Western German 
firms that are able to provide modern, efficient 
technology and training to ailing Eastern firms. 
Since Eastern Germany is still suffering from 
low productivity levels, it is clear that not 
enough transfer has occurred to create a sus-
tainable economy. More Western German 
enterprises must move eastward so that they 
become fully integrated with their Eastern 
counterparts, thereby facilitating technology 
transfer and vocational training. (Carlin) 
However, the lack of a linking mechanism, or 
means of transfer, between the two portions of 
Germany is preventing the eastward develop-
ment of Western German enterprises. As a 
result, the country remains segregated and 
behaves as if the Wall was never torn down. 
The Japanese Model and the German 
Comparison 
The economic problems faced by Japan 
after World War II are similar to what Eastern 
Germany is facing today. Mter losing the war, 
Japan's primary objective was to rebuild its 
economy. Leaders realized that this could only 
be achieved by facilitating the development of 
industry through the transfer of Western tech-
nology and the search for recent scientific and 
technological advances. Indeed, Japan trans-
ferred technology worth $10 billion from the 
United States during the 1950s and 1960s. The 
country's leaders understood that progress 
required incorporating state-of-the-art tech-
nology and the newest equipment in their fac-
tories. In order to teach its citizens how to uti-
lize this innovative technology, Japan also 
invested in training and education. To this day, 
the government continues to be active in tech-
nological innovation by establishing engineer-
ing schools at the university level and sending 
students abroad for study in science and tech-
nology. In primary and secondary schools, there 
is a strong emphasis on science so that the pre-
college population is considered to be techno-
logically "literate." As a percentage of the pop-
ulation, Japan confers more engineering degrees 
today than the United States does; over 77,000 
degrees are awarded annually, which is 0.062 
percent of the population compared to 0.053 
percent in the United States. (Batarseh) 
If Eastern Germany is to follow the exam-
ple of Japan, it must first overcome several bar-
riers. While the two countries have many sim-
ilarities, Germany's path to complete economic 
recovery through the diffusion of technology 
will take more time than did Japan's because its 
absorptive capacity is lower than Japan's. 
Although factories and infrastructure were lev-
eled during the war in both countries, Japan did 
not have to work through the environmental, 
social, economic, and political problems left by 
decades of communist rule that Eastern 
Germany is now dealing with. Mter more than 
forty years of environmental decay because of 
the absence of stringent environmental poli-
cies, significant outlays must now be spent on 
cleanup. For example, in the Eastern German 
state of Saxony-Anhalt, the American company 
Dow Chemical took over the German enterprise 
Buna in an attempt to save part of the chemi-
cal industry. Dow Chemical converted Buna's 
facilities into a modern factory producing plas-
tics and basic chemicals, but at a cost of DM 10 
billion of state aid to pay for environmental 
cleanup and new investment. Because of this 
large subsidy, only 3,000 of the original30,000 
workers were retrained and kept, amounting to 
a cleanup cost of DM 3 million per job. ("The 
Eagle's Embrace") 
The German government also has to deal 
with a population that is generally unwilling to 
accept new ideas, thereby impeding technolo-
gy acceptance and transfer. Mter living under 
different regimes with completely different 
lifestyles, resentment between the East and 
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West has grown. Japan certainly did not have 
this difficulty. Westerners typically view 
Easterners as lazy workers who want the gov-
ernment to take care of them, while Easterners 
do not believe that Westerners truly understand 
the struggle they are experiencing. 
Furthermore, the Eastern Germans continual-
ly face difficulties with the rigid German bank-
ing system; smaller firms in Eastern Germany 
have not had an opportunity to build up solid 
reputations with banks, making it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to get capital to finance tech-
nology projects. Generally only the large com-
panies, which have much more economic and 
political muscle, can acquire the financing to 
undertake projects; the absence of small busi-
ness financing has contributed to the delay in 
technology transfer. In addition, the training 
and education system must be updated to 
accommodate new technology. Under social-
ism, since advanced technology was not neces-
sary, few people knew how to deal with it. 
Because of the absence of such technology, a 
proper training system was never created. 
One of the few organizations in Germany 
that was able to surmount these technology 
transfer barriers was the Treuhand agency. It 
had the task of selling the state-owned busi-
nesses to private buyers willing to make invest-
ments in upgrading technology. Although the 
cost to the German government has been large, 
the effect of this organization's work looks 
promising in the long run and is a potential 
bright spot in the arduous process of convert-
ing Eastern Germany's economy. 
Impact of the Lack of Technology 
Transfer 
The lack of technology transfer has had 
disastrous effects on Eastern Germany. 
Productivity has remained low, the level of 
exports has been sagging, and unemployment 
has soared. Although productivity has increased 
since 1990, it was still only half that of Western 
Germany in 1995, while labor costs were 25 per-
cent higher. (Carlin) Furthermore, in 1995 the 
new German states produced only 60 percent 
of what they consumed and invested, causing 
the Western sector of the country to make 
annual financial transfers to the East in the 
amounts of approximately 40 percent of the 
Eastern GDP. ("The Eagle's Embrace") These 
amounts have also been rising; for example, net 
transfers to Eastern Germany as a percentage 
of Western German GOP was 4.0 percent in 
1991, and 4.5 percent in 1995. (Carlin) In com-
parison, aid given to West Germany via the 
Marshall Plan in the late 1940s averaged less 
than 2 percent of West Germany's annual out-
put. To pay for this assistance, taxes have had 
to be raised, including the addition of a 7.5 per-
cent "solidarity surcharge" on the income tax. 
There is no clear sign that these transfers will 
end soon. ("The Eagle's Embrace") 
Another sign of Eastern Germany's depen-
dence on Western Germany is the fact that, 
although 20 percent of the German population 
resides in Eastern Germany, in 1994 only about 
two percent of Germany's exports came from 
the Eastern sector. ("The Eagle's Embrace") 
Eastern German net imports of Western 
German products were 61 percent of Eastern 
Germany's GDP in 1994, indicating a very 
strong reliance on Western German goods. The 
Eastern German unemployment rate has 
climbed from 11.2 percent in 1991 to 14.7 per-
cent in 1995 (Carlin); but if workers in subsi-
dized training schemes and early retirement 
programs are included in these figures, the rate 
would be as much as 25 percent. Working-age 
women, 80 percent of whom had jobs in East 
Germany, have been hit the hardest. 
Unemployment among women was 18.6 per-
cent in 1995, which was about twice the unem-
ployment rate for men. ("The Eagle's Embrace") 
Another indication of slow recovery is in 
the number of patent registrations in Germany 
compared to that in Japan. In 1994 Chancellor 
Kohl stated, "In microelectronics, the number 
of German patents between 1987 and 1992 
shrank from 289 to 181, while the Japanese reg-
istrations rose from 17,408 to 23,082." 
(Atkinson) All these economic indicators show 
that, because of inadequate technology transfer 
to Eastern Germany, the region is suffering from 
a huge gap between productivity and wages, mas-
sive unemployment, and a lack of innovation. 
Even the birth rate has declined - from 
1,400 per 100,000 in 1987 to 400 per 100,000 
in 1994- indicating insecurity on the part of 
Eastern German citizens. ("The Eagle's 
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Embrace") Eastern Germans are probably too 
apprehensive about their region's economic 
conditions to have children, or they are simply 
moving to more prosperous areas with more 
opportunities. Klaus-Dieter Schmidt of the 
Economic Institute in Kiel explains that, since 
it took West Germans more than forty years to 
recover from World War II, it would be impos-
sible for Eastern Germans to catch up in only a 
few years. (Menke-Gluckert, "Berlin: East Looks 
for Prosperity") These statistics could turn 
around in time, but only with the diffusion of 
improved technology and know-how into the 
Eastern German states. 
Mindset and Motivation 
The fundamental psychological differences 
that exist between the two parts of Germany pre-
sent significant obstacles to the successful tech-
nology transfer from West to East. After sever-
al decades of living under two completely 
different systems, the people of Germany have 
naturally grown apart. When two dissimilar 
countries that have been politically, socially, eco-
nomically, and emotionally divided finally erase 
the border that separates them, it can take a 
long time for the newly unified country to inte-
grate all aspects of the two separate societies. 
The initial euphoria of reunifying 
Germany has now disappeared. Few people pre-
dicted that the reunification process would take 
this long. When the Wall fell, Chancellor Kohl 
promised the people of Eastern Germany that 
their standard of living would soon equal that 
of Western Germany; but that day is yet to 
come. The Ossis, or Eastern Germans, typical-
ly view the Wessis, or Western Germans, as 
arrogant, stubborn, and unforgiving people who 
have stolen companies and jobs away from the 
Easterners. On the other hand, the Wessis gen-
erally believe that the Ossis are unsophisticat-
ed, lack self-confidence and experience, and are 
always complaining. Life now is considered to 
be worse in the East according to 89 percent of 
Eastern Germans surveyed in a 1996 poll. 
Moreover, 84 percent of Eastern Germans say 
that the government is doing too little to help. 
In contrast, the Western Germans are tired of 
financially supporting the people in the East 
and believe that the East has an excessive 
dependence on the government. They assert 
that, instead of expecting more help from the 
West, Eastern Germans should learn how to 
function in a market economy. (Beck, p. S6) 
Interestingly, two-thirds of Germans liv-
ing in the East consider themselves to be "East 
German" as opposed to German. (Beck, p. S6) 
Also, according to a 1994 survey of Eastern 
German attitudes by market researchers Peter 
Dietrich and Uta Freising, only 8 people out of 
200 interviewed said that democracy was a "pos-
itive change." They see Western Germans as 
very competitive, self-involved, and always con-
cerned with getting ahead. Many Eastern 
Germans even remain loyal to Eastern German 
products that were sold prior to reunification; 
they do not seem to want to give up their old 
style of living. (Talbot, p.12) 
If there is still such an emotional division 
between the people and such negative stereotypes 
abound, how can Easterners welcome the tech-
nology of the West? If improved technology is 
simply viewed as an extension of the Western 
dominance in the Eastern region, can the 
Easterners accept this new technology from peo-
ple they see as overbearing and unforgiving? 
Some Western German managers believe that the 
East has the wrong attitude regarding new tech-
nology. After not seeing much new technology 
for forty years, it is understandably difficult for 
many, especially the older population, to change 
their way of thinking and to embrace new tech-
nology that will improve the quality and reduce 
the cost of manufactured products. It may take 
another generation before a united Germany can 
work together toward technological innovation. 
Education and Training 
For technology transfer to be successful, 
the receiver must have technological expertise. 
Even though a skilled workforce exists in Eastern 
Germany, workers do not know how to operate 
the newest and most cost efficient technology; 
rather they are familiar with obsolete, inefficient 
machinery and techniques that they have been 
using for decades. Experienced managers and 
executives from Western Germany or other parts 
of Europe are needed to train and manage work-
ers in new technologies. (Sy-Quia, p. 55) 
To further promote job training, Eastern 
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Germans might look to the West's apprentice-
ship system. Through the West German "dual 
system of education" that combines on-the-job 
training with public schooling, about 75 per-
cent of students between the ages of 15 and 25 
have apprenticeships. Typically, apprenticeship 
training starts between the ages of 16 and 19 
and lasts three to four years. Mter a specified 
period of time, students take a standardized 
exam that tests their theoretical and practical 
knowledge. If an apprentice passes, he/she 
receives a skilled worker's certificate. (Petrosky, 
p. 60) In effect, businesses and students make 
investments in each other; the firm spends 
money to develop the apprentice's practical 
skills, while the apprentice invests time to learn 
these skills while being paid a low wage. Both 
sides also take chances. The apprentice risks 
being used solely as cheap labor and may be 
denied the opportunity to develop worthwhile 
job skills, and the firm risks training an appren-
tice only to perhaps later lose the trained work-
er to another firm. (Culpepper, p. 1) 
The apprentice system has had remarkable 
success in Western Germany, but the majority 
of Eastern German firms cannot afford to invest 
in long-term training programs. For most 
companies in Eastern Germany, a semi-trained 
employee with limited experience is more valu-
able than an unskilled youngster who still 
attends school several days of the work week 
and does not directly contribute to the produc-
tivity of the company. (Sy-Quia, pp. 55-56) 
Since many young people cannot receive 
the training they need, many are migrating to 
Western Germany. According to Rainer Ortleb, 
the German Minister for Education in 1992, as 
many as 200,000 Eastern German students have 
migrated to the West for training. Further-
more, 446,000 Germans who still live in the 
East travel to the West to work. (Sy-Quia, 
pp. 56-57) Eastern Germany is losing man-
power and brainpower. Technology transfer will 
not take place if there is no one left in Eastern 
Germany capable of receiving it. 
Access to Capital and the Success of 
Large Companies 
Another barrier to technology transfer that 
Eastern Germans are facing is the fact that 
entrepreneurs in the region have not had a 
chance to build up reputations with the banks 
in the relatively short time since reunification. 
As a result, banks typically do not finance tech-
nology projects in Eastern Germany. According 
to Peter Kramer, the president of Europe's 500, 
an organization of the European Union's fastest 
developing small- and medium-sized companies, 
"Owners of start-ups have virtually no access to 
bank loans. Once a company proves itself and 
may no longer need the money, banks line up to 
give it money." (Bailon, p. 29) Whereas young 
entrepreneurs should be viewed as sources of 
innovation, they are too often perceived as high-
risk, low-return gambles. Banks investing in 
Eastern Germany put most of their money in 
building and road construction and in large 
companies, where investments are safe. ("Costly 
Saxon Klaxons ... ") However, more investment 
is needed to modernize manufacturing. 
The large companies can get the financ-
ing they need because they have been able to 
build up a track record. For example, the 
General Motors company Opel owns a plant in 
Eisenach that has succeeded because the com-
pany knew how to take risks. A large firm with 
American support, Opel had the time to grow 
into a leading car manufacturer. In 1992, Opel 
opened its plant in Eisenach to build its Corsa 
model, but it was not until1995 that it report-
ed a profit for the first time. In fact, according 
to a 1996 survey conducted by the Economic 
Intelligence Unit, Opel's plant is the most pro-
ductive plant in Europe. In 1995, Opel's 
Eisenach plant manufactured 71.9 cars per 
employee, an increase from 59.3 cars in 1994. 
The second place competitor, Fiat, in Melfi, is 
significantly behind with 64.3 cars per employ-
ee. Moreover, as of the end of 1996, production 
capabilities are still being built up, and the 
plant's system of lean production and efficien-
cy enhancing techniques will serve as a model 
for Opel's new facilities in Argentina, Poland, 
Thailand, and China. (Menke-Gluckert, 
"Eastern Efficiency") 
Another success occurred in the south-
eastern German town of Zwickau, once the 
home of an East German Trabant automobile 
plant. Sixty-eight percent of the factory's 4,000 
jobs were saved by the German automobile 
giant Volkswagen, and a modern and more effi-
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cient plant replaced the original one. The com-
pany's net profits for the first six months of 
1996 increased almost 150 percent to $189 mil-
lion. ("Costly Saxon Klaxons ... ") In yet anoth-
er case, the semiconductor giant Siemens was 
given tax breaks as an incentive to build its new 
facility in Dresden in 1996. The subsidies paid 
for 40 to 50 percent of the DM 2. 7 billion cost 
and allowed Siemens to shift some of its chip 
production from low-wage Asia to high-wage 
Eastern Germany. ("Is Eastern Germany Really 
Bouncing Back?") The infrastructure was 
replaced, and the local population now has the 
benefit of a specialized semiconductor training 
center that Siemens built. This improvement 
was made possible through direct financial 
assistance from Dresden city authorities, the 
Saxon local government, and the European 
Commission. In addition, Dresdner Bank 
loaned $330 million to Siemens. (Flaherty) 
Large enterprises typically have much 
more lobbying power than smaller firms. 
Therefore, when the government creates new 
regulations, intricate bureaucratic processes, 
and arduous application procedures, the larger 
companies are usually able to overcome these 
hurdles, but smaller companies have to strug-
gle. (Wiesmann) In fact, according to Peter 
Kramer, the president of Europe's 500, "Small-
and medium-sized companies often find them-
selves victims of government indifference. For 
example, a small company in Germany that 
wants to build a new factory might have to wait 
a year before it gets all the necessary approvals, 
whereas a big company has to wait only six 
weeks." Moreover, Kramer contends that high 
tax rates create difficulties for small business-
es to accumulate the capital necessary for devel-
opment. A corporate tax rate of 66 percent in 
Germany causes cash-flow problems that will 
often destroy small enterprises or subject them 
to takeovers. (Bailon, p. 29) 
Since most banks are unwilling to provide 
financial backing to young entrepreneurs, large 
scale businesses are dominating the market-
place. According to a 1996 report, much of 
Eastern German industry remains uncompeti-
tive in the world's markets. (Menke-Gluckert, 
"Eastern Efficiency") The reason is that compa-
nies like Opel and Siemens are obstructing entry 
into the marketplace by acquiring most of the 
financing. Germany needs to encourage tech-
nological innovation by giving smaller compa-
nies an opportunity to establish themselves. 
For Germany to succeed in accomplishing 
this task, more money must be invested in 
research and development centers that promote 
both technology development and transfer to 
small businesses. At the end of the 1980s, near-
ly 3 percent of Germany's GOP was spent on 
research and development, but this number has 
fallen to below 2.3 percent in 1996. 
Fortunately, during that same year, the research 
ministry announced plans to increase funding 
by 5 percent for the institutional research cen-
ters Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the 
Max Planck Society, and 1.5 percent for the 
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft. (Blau) The govern-
ment must provide still more incentives for 
these institutions of technology innovation in 
order to see an improvement in technology 
transfer. One of the leading organizations of 
applied research, the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, 
operates 4 7 research establishments in 
Germany and employs 4,250 scientists and 
engineers. ("Fraunhofer Gesellschaft") The 
German government provides 30 percent of its 
income. (Lunsford) The institute's mission is 
to improve the productivity and competitive-
ness of German manufacturers, to provide assis-
tance to small- and medium-sized companies 
that cannot support large enough development 
departments of their own, and to facilitate the 
swift transfer of innovations. Among its eight 
fields of research are production technology, 
information and communication, process engi-
neering, and technical and economic studies. 
("Fraunhofer Gesellschaft") Small German 
businesses need institutions like the Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft to provide them with the know-
how they need. Financial support from the gov-
ernment and from large companies will make 
innovation institutions more accessible to 
struggling companies. Even though the 
German government has spent billions of dol-
lars to unite the two German sectors, it should 
realize that still more funding to expand inno-
vation and research centers is critical in order 
to accelerate the revival of small- and medium-
sized enterprises. 
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Treuhand and Its Impact on 
Technology Transfer 
While many obstacles were impeding 
effective technology transfer in Eastern 
Germany, the Treuhandanstalt (or Treuhand 
agency) was formed to overcome some of these 
problems by reorganizing and privatizing busi-
nesses formerly owned by the government of 
East Germany. This agency was formed when 
Germany passed the First Trusteeship Law on 
March 1, 1990, and it held the belief that invest-
ment in technology was crucial in keeping com-
panies alive. Its aim was to sell some 12,000 
varied companies to buyers who planned to 
increase productivity potential by upgrading 
technology and bringing the Eastern managers 
into contact with Western managerial and tech-
nical expertise. (von der Heyden) The Treuhand 
served as one of the few linking mechanisms for 
technology transfer. 
The Treuhand operated from July 1990, 
when it was essentially the world's largest hold-
ing company, to December 1994. Since its bud-
get was not controlled by the German parlia-
ment, the agency enjoyed independence from 
the government. In order to prepare the 12,000 
companies for capitalism, the Treuhand 
searched for suitable buyers who could bring 
knowledge, technology, customers, and growth 
potential to these enterprises. People who were 
willing to promise to continue the businesses, 
to preserve as many jobs as economically pos-
sible, and to invest additional money into the 
companies were given highest priority. In 
exchange, investors received generous subsi-
dies and loans from the federal and local gov-
ernments. Since the Treuhand agreed to pay 
investors to assume old debts and environ-
mental liabilities, the agency considered the 
market potential, environmental liabilities, 
physical state of each plant, and financial state 
of each company. (von der Heyden) As Birgit 
Breuel, the president of the Treuhand, explained 
in a September 1992 interview: 
When an investor buys a company 
from the Treuhand, he has to deliver 
a ... financing program. We want 
these companies to be successful, so 
we help ... by ... taking over old debts 
to some extent.... We always try to 
have several bidders for each compa-
ny on sale. Each has to deliver a 
business plan, which includes figures 
for investment, jobs, [and] financing. 
And the bidder who becomes the 
owner has his figures written into 
the contract. (Evans, pp. 179-80) 
The Treuhand insisted on certain conditions for 
future investment and employment, but it still 
had to privatize quickly since the crumbling 
economy was growing worse as unemployment 
increased. ("Farewell, Sweet Treuhand") 
Before it closed in December, 1994, the 
Treuhand managed to privatize over 8,000 com-
panies and secure jobs for 1.5 million people 
(von der Heyden), leaving only approximately 
100 companies left to be sold or liquidated. 
("Farewell, Sweet Treuhand") Most important-
ly, private investors committed themselves to 
spend more than $130 billion to revitalize the 
ailing Eastern German economy. (Gumbel) The 
majority of large companies were sold to either 
Western German or other European investors 
from the same industry, and many smaller com-
panies were bought by their managers. The 
final assessment of the Treuhand's effectiveness 
cannot be made, however, until the flow of sub-
sidies stops and the investment promises of the 
businesses' new owners are fulfilled. ("Farewell, 
Sweet Treuhand") 
Because of the speed of privatization, the 
Treuhand's policies have had some negative side 
effects on the economy, but these effects were 
inevitable and should disappear in the long 
term since they can essentially be considered 
"growing pains." Unemployment has increased; 
for example, of the 66,000 employees working 
in the steel industry in 1990, only 10,000 were 
left at the end of 1994. (Gumbel) Some have 
argued that the Treuhand's political indepen-
dence and its goal to privatize as quickly as pos-
sible destroyed jobs and firms that could have 
been saved. According to a 1994 poll published 
in Suddeutsche Zeitung a Munich-based news-
paper, 91 percent of Eastern Germans have a 
low opinion of the Treuhand. ("Farewell, Sweet 
Treuhand") 
However, many others argue that the 
Treuhand's policies were needed in order to inte-
grate new technology in the East. There are also 
signs that the Eastern German economy is start-
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ing to improve; production has been growing at 
a rate of 8.5 percent annually after falling 30 per-
cent in the two years after unification. (Gumbel) 
Prior to the Treuhand's work, most factories in 
Eastern Germany were simply not equipped to 
be competitive. There was not enough state-of-
the-art technology, such as computer systems 
and computer-aided design and manufacturing 
capabilities. Machines were outdated, and those 
purchased from the West generally served only 
as prototypes that had to be physically duplicat-
ed by Eastern German engineers. Moreover, 
because of the socialist system that they had lived 
under for decades, Eastern German managers 
typically lacked contacts, supplier relationships, 
marketing skills, and the technical know-how 
needed to compete in a market economy. Thus, 
according to Klaus-Dieter Schmidt of the Kiel 
Institute of World Economics, "The Treuhand 
was a buyer of management, technology, and 
access to markets for its companies, rather than 
an asset seller." ("Farewell, Sweet Treuhand") 
A prime example of a Treuhand success 
story is EKO Stahl GmbH on the Polish border 
in Eisenhuttenstadt, or "Iron Works City." The 
plant was a failure when it was operated by the 
East German government because planners 
neglected to build a hot rolling mill, which plays 
a critical role in the steel production process. 
This process was instead outsourced to Russia 
and West Germany at a cost that prevented EKO 
Stahl from ever turning a profit. Compounding 
this problem, the site of the plant near the Oder 
River was a poor choice since the river is not nav-
igable for heavy boatloads of steel, coal, or ore. 
With 12,000 workers, poor quality products, a 
European market inundated with steel produc-
ers, and the company losing money, this enter-
prise was an ideal candidate for liquidation. 
Instead, the Treuhand took four years and spent 
$300 million to cover operating losses and 
offered $100 million in loan guarantees to 
investors who would close the plant's technolo-
gy gap. This lengthy and expensive search was 
necessary because, according to the Economics 
Ministry, technology used in the Eastern German 
steel plants was at least a decade behind that in 
Western Germany. Eventually, Belgium's 
Cockerill Sambre SA invested $280 million to 
build a hot-strip mill, upgrade a blast furnace, 
and keep about 2,000 of the original12,000 jobs 
in exchange for $610 million in subsidies. 
Although the company is still losing money, it 
has used its loans to upgrade its facilities even 
further with more advanced technology, there-
by raising the quality of its steel and increasing 
productivity. It now sells sheet metal to 
Mercedes and exports steel slabs to the United 
States. Overall, this is an excellent example of 
the Treuhand's commitment to capital-intensive 
investments in the hopes of securing jobs and 
future investments by the new owners. (Gumbel) 
To use another example, the Treuhand has 
turned around the ESKA Group, a conglomer-
ation of three fastener plants and a wire draw-
ing facility that supplies parts for the automo-
tive industry. This company was another 
suitable candidate for liquidation since ESKA 
manufactured screws that could be bought 
from Eastern European countries at lower 
prices. The Treuhand hired an independent 
expert to determine the environmental cleanup 
costs of the wastewater and soil and a consul-
tant from the fastener industry to evaluate the 
plant and equipment. Even though the plant 
was found to be run-down and filled with slow, 
undependable equipment, the Treuhand still 
decided to look for investors. The ESKA plants 
were subsequently sold separately to investors 
with credible reputations and contacts in the 
industry and who had agreed to certain invest-
ment and employment levels. (von der Heyden) 
Outlook 
Germany has many obstacles to overcome 
in its effort to bring its Eastern sector up to the 
productivity and employment levels of its 
Western sector. First, Germans from both sec-
tors must put aside their preconceived opinions 
of each other that were fostered by decades of 
political and economic differences. Second, 
Eastern Germany needs to adopt the education 
and training system of the Western sector. 
Financial support from both the government 
and large enterprises is necessary to compen-
sate smaller businesses for the lost time appren-
tices spend in the classroom, away from the 
plant floor. With new technology being trans-
ferred to Eastern Germany, the workforce must 
go through a continual training program that 
is updated each time new technology is intro-
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duced. Such a training system will produce a 
more flexible workforce, leading naturally to an 
increase in productivity. Third, banks must be 
willing to take more chances on young entre-
preneurs who are interested in technological 
innovation. Although entrepreneurs may be 
high-risk, if they are not given financial support 
from the banks, technological creativity will be 
hampered and innovation is certain to fail. 
Germany might look to Silicon Valley for 
a model of technology transfer since this 
California region repaired its sluggish economy 
by defining new markets through innovation. 
After becoming internationally recognized dur-
ing the 1970s as a world leader in the electron-
ics industry, Silicon Valley's economy fell apart 
in the following decade. However, the region 
recovered impressively by remembering that it 
was cooperation and collective innovation that 
spurred its original success. Because of collab-
oration among companies, Silicon Valley now 
boasts one-third of the largest 100 technology 
companies formed in the United States since 
1965, and its market value has risen by $25 bil-
lion between 1986 and 1990. Approximately 
150,000 technology-related jobs were generat-
ed between 1975 and 1990, and in 1990 its com-
panies exported electronics products worth 
more than $11 billion, which was almost one-
third of the nation's total. (Saxenian) 
As a united country, both sectors of 
Germany urgently need to encourage such inven-
tiveness by promoting unified goals for technol-
ogy development and transfer. In summary, there 
are several ways to speed up this process: the infu-
sion of Western German companies in Eastern 
Germany, the sharing of technology and manu-
facturing concepts among firms, an overhaul of 
the Eastern German education and training sys-
tem to match that of the Western sector, an eas-
ing of strict banking policies so that banks are 
willing to support young entrepreneurs, and an 
increase in financial support to innovation cen-
ters and institutes. The recommendations pre-
sented here should result in the transfer of tech-
nology that will increase productivity, enabling 
Eastern German firms to compete more effec-
tively in the global marketplace. Otherwise, the 
country will continue to be composed of two dif-
ferent cultures, having dissimilar economies and 
technological capabilities. 
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